Master and Slave: The Fatal Error of Marx
Alexander Dugin argues that Marx misread Hegel, mistaking an eternal structure of consciousness for a historical problem that could be abolished.
The model of the relationship between Master and Slave was examined in detail by Hegel. There is an interesting moment within it. In fact, Marx built his doctrine of revolution on this very passage. The Master struggles, preferring death and freedom (that is, for him freedom and death are one and the same), while the Slave chooses not freedom, but slavery and life. Whoever chooses life chooses slavery; whoever chooses death chooses freedom. Thus death, freedom, and mastery form one side, while life, survival, material production, the processing of beings, and slavery form the other.
In this way, two philosophical types emerge. Note that we are speaking of philosophical types. Of course, the temptation immediately arises to apply this to sociology, anthropology, ethnology, the structure of society, and classes. Marx did exactly that: he posited masters and slaves and the idea of a slave uprising. Marxism is built on the premise that the slave has no consciousness of his own, and therefore the exploited masses of feudal society (or an even more ancient one) live not by their own consciousness but by the consciousness of the ruling class. They do not know themselves, becoming aware of themselves only through the consciousness of the masters. They lack self-consciousness, while the masters possess it.
Hegel goes on to say that in the battle with death, and in the battles of death itself with its reflections and echoes, the Master does not attain immortality in the full sense of the word, although that is precisely what he seeks. Instead, he acquires the Slave. The one who fled from him, who could not withstand his emptiness and his gaze, becomes his prey. And the Slave, having become a Slave, gains the opportunity not to look into the eyes of his master, to lower his gaze—that is, not to look death in the face—and accordingly he gains life, although he is no longer free. And what does freedom mean? For Hegel, freedom is self-consciousness, and only self-consciousness is freedom. Whoever is free is conscious of his own consciousness—Selbstbewußtsein. Whoever is unfree does not recognize his selfhood: this is precisely what unfreedom is. Freedom has no other parameters. Social position, for example that of dependent exploited classes or ruling classes, is merely the consequence of the realization of certain philosophical orientations and movements that occur within the subject. The subject who insists on his self-consciousness to the very end either perishes or becomes dominant. The subject who evades this resistance, who withdraws from it, swells the masses, as the Polish Sarmatists or the Hungarian adherents of Scythian ideology believed.
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Οι Πολιτείες στις οποίες κυριαρχεί η Δικαιοσύνη είναι ευτυχισμένες, στις Πολιτείες πού κυριαρχεί η Αδικία, αυτές οι Πολιτείες δυστυχουν, έχει πει ο Σωκράτης. Εκεί λοιπόν πού βασιλεύει η Αδικία υπάρχει η σχέση Αφέντη - Σκλάβου,οι οποίοι αντιμάχονται μεταξύ τους. Εκεί πού βασιλεύει η Δικαιοσύνη ζεί ο καλός Ποιμένας με το Ποίμνιο του σέ Αρμονία,η Δικαιοσύνη προβλέπει ο καθένας νά ασχολείται με τά δικά του πράγματα. Ο Ποιμένας φροντίζει για τό ποίμνιο του,ο Αφέντης κρατάει τά είδωλα καί παραπλανά τόν Σκλάβο προκειμένου νά παραμείνει αιώνια σκλάβος. Ελεύθερος άνθρωπος είναι αυτός πού χαλιναγωγεί τά ορμεμφυτα του (άλογα), δεν τά σκοτώνει, δεν τά τραυματίζει ' τά εκπαιδεύει, είναι η κινητήριος δύναμη του. Όποιος δεν το καταφέρει είναι υποψήφιος Σκλάβος τού Αφέντη. Υπάρχει έλλειψη καλών Ποιμένων καί πληθώρα Αφεντάδων, στο τέλος τό κακό τρώει τίς σάρκες του.