Russia’s Failed Eurasian Project

Alexander Dugin argues that twenty-five years of neglect, incompetence, and sabotage have turned Putin’s vision of Eurasian integration into disintegration, demanding a complete strategic reset.

The question of our policy in the post-Soviet space requires very serious consideration. Practically from the very moment President Putin came to power twenty-five years ago, he set Eurasian integration as a priority. Yes, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was created and a number of similar initiatives were undertaken. But here is what is striking: if we step back from the routine of current events, then over these twenty-five years this task was not only left unfulfilled but, in fact, the opposite occurred.

We dismantled ties that had persisted, and we failed to maintain our influence in the post-Soviet space. Despite the enormous effort President Putin personally invested to correct the situation, at the institutional level, when matters were passed down to the next tier, everything spun out of control. There was no consistency, no strategy, no consolidation or coordination among ministries and agencies, no systematic use of major private business. In other words, Eurasian integration was effectively left to drift. Different people handled it in different years: sometimes competent, sometimes utterly incompetent.

At this point, I believe it is time to stop debating who was good, who was bad, who did what well, who did what poorly, or to what extent the post-Soviet states themselves were to blame. Because if the President and our society — which undoubtedly needs Eurasian integration, since it is a geopolitical imperative for us if we wish to become a center of a multipolar world — say: “Carry out Eurasian integration,” and yet no one does it, then it means either sabotage, incompetence, or outright subversion. This has gone on for the entire twenty-five years, with roots even earlier.

On our side, at the level of the International Eurasian Movement, which I have headed for more than twenty years, among the public, experts, intellectuals, specialists in political philosophy, geopolitics, and cultural dialogue — we have approached this issue from many directions. We engaged, we organized conferences with different countries, invited representatives of elites, developed strategies, and published numerous books. Every time we encountered complete indifference and unwillingness from those state institutions responsible for Eurasian integration to participate in any way. It felt as if the topic provoked in them a profound aversion. This was repeated again and again, no matter what we did: with Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, Moldova, or even Belarus. Each time, officials with their attitude and inaction seemed to be saying:

“We don’t need you; everything is under our control.”

Precisely these officials, who repeated this for twenty-five years, have now — if one looks at the real state of affairs — failed completely. Failed at everything. Putin said “integration,” and we got disintegration. Before our eyes, we are losing ties with the last countries that still retain some loyalty and friendship towards us. Not to mention the fact that the Special Military Operation is also a result of failed Eurasian integration.

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Russia’s Failed Eurasian Project