I think that this is a compelling and richly layered exposition from Alexander Dugin, reflecting not only his engagement with Heidegger but also his philosophical dramaturgy in the way he stages the great metaphysical narrative of the West. Reading through it, one immediately notices how Dugin appropriates Heidegger’s epochal framework to dramatize the unfolding of Western philosophy as a decline, a twilight march away from Being. I find this narrative both profoundly provocative and, at times, strategically mythic in tone. It’s a history less concerned with empirical details or academic nuance and more with establishing a metaphysical topology East and West, Beginning and End, Being and its Oblivion.
So, Dugin begins by situating Heidegger’s neglect of medieval philosophy as a deliberate philosophical gesture. Heidegger’s early engagements notwithstanding, the Middle Ages for him amount to little more than an amplification of Platonism under the guise of Christian scholasticism. Nietzsche’s phrase, “Christianity is Platonism for the masses,” becomes an axiom that justifies a sweeping dismissal. This point is made with admirable clarity by Dugin: scholastic theology, for Heidegger, merely continues Plato’s foundational move of placing the Idea (the Good) above Being, thereby displacing Being itself from thought. This removal of Being from the philosophical core is not, in this account, a flaw unique to Christianity, but a systemic element of Western metaphysics from the start. I agree with Dugin’s reading that for Heidegger, this Platonic shift marks the original distortion, a turning away from the pre-Socratics, who still had some sense of Being’s primordiality.
It’s in Heidegger’s treatment of modernity, however, that Dugin finds real philosophical tension. Descartes emerges not as a reformer but as a catalyst for the “Beginning of the End.” This phrase a counterpoint to the original “Beginning” in pre-Socratic thought captures the dual role Descartes plays: on one hand, he strips metaphysics of its theological garments, and on the other, he intensifies the ontological crisis. Dugin is right to underscore how, for Heidegger, Cartesian dualism turns Being into a function of epistemology. The subject-object split becomes the birthplace of technical rationality, of logos wielded like an instrument. There’s something chilling in this transformation. The world is no longer revealed, it is calculated. The thinker no longer dwells in Being, he masters it or tries to in my opinion.
I think that this is the moment when Gestell begins to assert itself historically. Gestell, that peculiar Heideggerian term for the technological enframing of reality, is no longer latent; it starts to structure the entire human relation to Being. Dugin’s reading emphasizes how Heidegger sees modern philosophy whether Cartesian rationalism, British empiricism, or Kantian critique as variously deepening the forgetfulness of Being while simultaneously clarifying the metaphysical structure of that forgetting. The irony, as Dugin makes plain, is that modernity renders nihilism more transparent. It says what metaphysics always did, but more bluntly.
The discussion then pivots to Hegel and Nietzsche. Here Dugin is especially insightful. Hegel is framed as the last great systematizer of Western metaphysics, the one who tried to close the philosophical narrative by sublimating it into the Absolute Idea. He represents the moment in which the metaphysical tradition becomes self-aware, yet still operates within the old structures concepts, categories, the referential theory of truth. Heidegger, as Dugin notes, respects Hegel’s ambition and his attention to Heraclitus, but he sees in Hegel an ultimate failure: the failure to break free of metaphysics by still thinking Being in terms of the conceptual.
Nietzsche, then, is treated not as a radical outsider, but as the final insider. The will to power, the death of God, the transvaluation of values these are not new beginnings, in Heidegger’s view, but terminal intensifications. Nietzsche, says Dugin via Heidegger, is metaphysics distilled to its most nihilistic essence. I find this assessment particularly compelling: Nietzsche’s break with tradition is only apparent. His Superman and will to power are not liberations from metaphysics but its consummations. Dugin’s phrase “accomplished End” captures this neatly. Nietzsche is both the gravedigger and the last priest of metaphysical thinking.
Thus I think in Heidegger’s view, as interpreted by Dugin, Western philosophy unfolds as a tragic arc. From the Greek inception, through medieval distortion, to modern dissolution, it is a history of deontologization a progressive forgetting and loss of Being. This process is not accidental, not correctable, and certainly not morally condemnable. It is a fate—a destiny of the Abendland, the Land of Evening. Here Dugin makes one of his most philosophically resonant points: this is not an intellectual mistake but a geographical and ontological condition. The West had to forget Being. It was bound to.
But all is not despair. Dugin then takes us to Heidegger’s later thought the notion of another Beginning, the possibility of Ereignis. Now, this part of the text, while dense, is profoundly hopeful in a dark way. Ereignis, which is often mistranslated as simply “event,” is something far more radical in Heidegger: it is the event of appropriation, of Being giving itself. Dugin is careful to stress that this new Beginning is not a return to pre-Socratic wisdom but a step forward through the End, not away from it.
This “another Beginning” is structured through paradox. Being must be thought as including nothing, as both Being and non-Being. Heidegger challenges Parmenides here: non-being is, too. The whole of Western philosophy, then, becomes a history not of Being, but of its concealment. Yet that concealment, says Dugin via Heidegger, is also a form of unconcealment. It’s negative theology applied to ontology. We know Being not through its presence, but through the marks its absence leaves.
And then there is Geviert, the fourfold—sky and earth, mortals and gods—this poetic topology drawn from Hölderlin and reoriented by Heidegger. Dugin’s inclusion of this image is apt, because it signals the turn away from conceptual thinking toward poetic dwelling. This is the sort of ontological grammar that cannot be translated into logic or epistemology. It has to be inhabited, lived.
Dugin’s reading culminates in a powerful inversion: the very darkness into which Western thought has fallen becomes the place from which a new light might emerge. But not a light of clarity—rather, a “saving power” hidden within danger itself. The fall into nihilism is not a dead end but the abyss from which a new relation to Being might emerge. The way down is the way through.
In sum, Dugin does more than summarize Heidegger; he performs a kind of metaphysical liturgy. His interpretation is passionate, mythic, and unapologetically grand. While it may lack the cautious sobriety of analytic commentary, it more than compensates with philosophical intensity. Whether one agrees with Dugin’s appropriation of Heidegger or not, it is impossible to ignore the depth and drama he brings to this reading. He asks us not just to understand philosophy, but to see its death, and maybe, just maybe, its rebirth.
Dugin's take on Heidegger is clearly eschatological(...as I have already pointed out in several occasions). His interpretation leans heavily on the idea that Heidegger points us toward an end, not just of metaphysics, but of a whole civilizational cycle. Heidegger never lays out eschatology as a structured system or apparatus, but that impulse is definitely there, especially in his later work. The Ereignis (the event) feels like a turning point, almost apocalyptic in tone, where something radically new could break through after the long night of metaphysics. Heidegger’s ontotheological critique, especially in Identität und Differenz, brings out deep tensions regarding the philosophy of History, and the history of philosophy. He exposes how Hegel, the scholastics, and early modern thinkers like Descartes are all entangled in a metaphysical framework that conceals Being; not in a progressive way, but completely topological, in spirals if we want to see it dynamically. In that sense, Heidegger comes off as more eschatological than genealogical. He is not tracing the history of values like Nietzsche does; he is calling for a rupture, a break, a new beginning altogether.
This comment provides a provocative and ambitious reading of Alexander Dugin’s interpretation of Martin Heidegger, with a focus on the eschatological dimension of Heidegger’s later thought. A detailed critique then follows, examining its philosophical framing, interpretive fidelity, strengths, and limitations.
The author asserts that Dugin’s reading of Heidegger is clearly eschatological. This is a strong claim, and it is only partially justified. Dugin, particularly in The Fourth Political Theory, engages Heidegger not as a purely ontological thinker, but as one who offers a vision for civilizational renewal or more precisely, for a final confrontation with Western nihilism. Dugin reinterprets Heidegger through a mystical-political lens, making the Ereignis into a kind of historical-ontological rupture, an event signaling not just the end of metaphysics but of the modern West itself.
However, the term eschatological needs qualification. Traditionally, eschatology implies a teleological end, a final cause or ultimate state such as in Christian theology, the end of time or the Second Coming. Heidegger himself was wary of teleology; his critique of metaphysics was precisely that it concealed Being by framing it in terms of ends, purposes, and causal explanation. So while Dugin may interpret Heidegger in this eschatological frame, it would be inaccurate to ascribe this reading to Heidegger himself without heavy caveats.
The statement risks conflating Dugin’s geopolitical-mystical project with Heidegger’s more phenomenological and ontological ambitions. The phrase Heidegger points us toward an end verges on oversimplification, unless we distinguish between Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysical ends and Dugin’s apocalyptic reterritorialization.
The author describes Ereignis, the event of appropriation, as almost apocalyptic in tone. This is an interpretively rich and partially justified claim. Heidegger’s Ereignis especially in the Contributions to Philosophy and Time and Being does signal a rupture with the history of metaphysics. It is neither a discrete event nor a linear culmination, but rather a clearing in which Being comes into its own after a long period of concealment.
Describing it as apocalyptic is poetically resonant, but possibly misleading. The apocalypse implies revealing from apokalypsis, and in this sense, it aligns with Heidegger’s vocabulary of unconcealment, aletheia. However, Heidegger resists any temporal finality or anthropocentric teleology that apocalyptic language often carries.
Framing Ereignis as apocalyptic risks obscuring its ontological subtlety. While Ereignis may feel like a rupture, Heidegger treats it as an ontological possibility that is historical but not historicist. The tone may seem eschatological, but its structure is anti-eschatological; it is not an end but a new opening, a shift in Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being.
The passage correctly emphasizes Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, the idea that metaphysics equates Being with a supreme being such as God, subject, or idea. This critique is foundational in Identität und Differenz, where Heidegger explores the tension between identity and difference as foundational to Western metaphysics.
The assertion that this critique reveals deep tensions regarding the philosophy of History and the history of philosophy is well observed. Heidegger is concerned with how the history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche represents a progressive forgetting of Being, culminating in technological enframing, Gestell, in modernity. This forgetting is not progressive in a developmental sense but topological, as the author notes—folded, spiraling, and recursive.
The author astutely invokes topology and spiral structure. This aligns with Heidegger’s nonlinear understanding of history as epochal, not linear. The metaphor of the spiral is apt for illustrating Heidegger’s notion that Being is repeatedly approached but always withdrawn.
The contrast between Heidegger and Nietzsche is handled provocatively but somewhat schematically. Nietzsche’s genealogical method analyzes the origin and evolution of values. Heidegger critiques Nietzsche for remaining within the metaphysical tradition, even as he tries to subvert it. Heidegger believes Nietzsche merely inverts the metaphysical table rather than overturning it.
The author claims Heidegger is not tracing the history of values but calling for a rupture. This is accurate insofar as Heidegger is not engaged in moral genealogy but in ontological retrieval. Yet it misses that both thinkers are historical—Nietzsche historically deconstructs morality; Heidegger historically deconstructs ontology.
The more eschatological than genealogical binary may be rhetorically effective, but it underplays Heidegger’s own genealogical moments, especially in Nietzsche and Introduction to Metaphysics. Heidegger does trace conceptual histories—he just does so to show their ontological distortions.
The idea that Heidegger’s thought entails the end of a whole civilizational cycle fits Dugin’s interpretation more than Heidegger’s own. Dugin uses Heidegger to frame a clash of civilizations, opposing liberal modernity with a Eurasian alternative grounded in Tradition, Myth, and Destiny. For Dugin, Heidegger provides a metaphysical basis for a post-liberal, multi-polar world.
Here the author might do more to differentiate between Heidegger’s metaphysical concerns and Dugin’s ideological aims. Dugin instrumentalizes Heidegger in a way that Heidegger himself would likely resist, particularly given his deep ambivalence toward nationalism and his eventual disillusionment with political solutions.
Overall, the passage offers an insightful and imaginative interpretation of Dugin’s Heidegger, but it tends to blur Heidegger’s ontological precision with Dugin’s eschatological mysticism. Its strengths lie in noticing the tone of Heidegger’s later work, invoking Ereignis and ontotheology with sensitivity, and articulating a rich topological metaphor for Heidegger’s history of Being.
Its limitations include slipping into a rhetorical conflation of Heidegger and Dugin, using eschatological in ways that risk mischaracterizing Heidegger’s anti-teleological stance, and underplaying the subtle genealogical aspects of Heidegger’s historical critique.
To refine this passage further, it would help to differentiate between Heidegger’s ontology of rupture and Dugin’s geopolitical eschaton, while preserving the rhetorical intensity of the original.
The thing is even Heidegger still stood without what he would usher in. Ultimately all he had were more ideas of the Next. It did take a German to embody it, in the research of Goethe we already have a beginning experience of the identity of being and thought/'interiority' in his experience of the Urplanze, and his colour investigations. It took an Austrian, in R. Steiner, to make a science of this, and it should have taken some Anglos to make it mundane, industried, and commercial rather than only more individual, substantial, and articulated. But this has not been forthcoming, perhaps we will have to wait for the returning tide back to the european East, slavs, or Russians, who will manage to transmute their current tendancy to ritualize it. Transmute RS's work into a re-sacralized scientia... a profoundly human wisdom full of technique and practic.
It’s so wonderful to see the pre-sagement of Rudolf Steiner here (despite the fact he was dead already, his work hovered, still hovers, waiting to be activated in the Darkness). “We have presented the human being as resting upon his own foundation, both in thinking and in action. We have designated his world of ideas as coinciding with the world fundament…”. Being and Idea in identity.
I need to express appreciation of your exposition. The bodies are piling up in the sequential episodes of Heidegger where the eventful fourth body bag makes the home coming.
The resemblance to the first part of the series is slim. But each presents a different facet.
I so appreciate this thoughtful overview of the trajectory of Western European philosophical thought. It has cleared up a lot of fuzzy understandings for me, tied up in a very neat package. With morning tea in hand and notepaper and pen, a lot has been cleared up for my understanding and we will be printing it for further clarity. Thank you. (Krys)
That tendency towards nihilism is peculiar. I have been finding, taking this back towards faith, the choice is always death of faith or death in faith. We have a choice. In one, we fall out of the divine. With the other, I think, we fall into the divine which is the path of meaning.
I think that this is a compelling and richly layered exposition from Alexander Dugin, reflecting not only his engagement with Heidegger but also his philosophical dramaturgy in the way he stages the great metaphysical narrative of the West. Reading through it, one immediately notices how Dugin appropriates Heidegger’s epochal framework to dramatize the unfolding of Western philosophy as a decline, a twilight march away from Being. I find this narrative both profoundly provocative and, at times, strategically mythic in tone. It’s a history less concerned with empirical details or academic nuance and more with establishing a metaphysical topology East and West, Beginning and End, Being and its Oblivion.
So, Dugin begins by situating Heidegger’s neglect of medieval philosophy as a deliberate philosophical gesture. Heidegger’s early engagements notwithstanding, the Middle Ages for him amount to little more than an amplification of Platonism under the guise of Christian scholasticism. Nietzsche’s phrase, “Christianity is Platonism for the masses,” becomes an axiom that justifies a sweeping dismissal. This point is made with admirable clarity by Dugin: scholastic theology, for Heidegger, merely continues Plato’s foundational move of placing the Idea (the Good) above Being, thereby displacing Being itself from thought. This removal of Being from the philosophical core is not, in this account, a flaw unique to Christianity, but a systemic element of Western metaphysics from the start. I agree with Dugin’s reading that for Heidegger, this Platonic shift marks the original distortion, a turning away from the pre-Socratics, who still had some sense of Being’s primordiality.
It’s in Heidegger’s treatment of modernity, however, that Dugin finds real philosophical tension. Descartes emerges not as a reformer but as a catalyst for the “Beginning of the End.” This phrase a counterpoint to the original “Beginning” in pre-Socratic thought captures the dual role Descartes plays: on one hand, he strips metaphysics of its theological garments, and on the other, he intensifies the ontological crisis. Dugin is right to underscore how, for Heidegger, Cartesian dualism turns Being into a function of epistemology. The subject-object split becomes the birthplace of technical rationality, of logos wielded like an instrument. There’s something chilling in this transformation. The world is no longer revealed, it is calculated. The thinker no longer dwells in Being, he masters it or tries to in my opinion.
I think that this is the moment when Gestell begins to assert itself historically. Gestell, that peculiar Heideggerian term for the technological enframing of reality, is no longer latent; it starts to structure the entire human relation to Being. Dugin’s reading emphasizes how Heidegger sees modern philosophy whether Cartesian rationalism, British empiricism, or Kantian critique as variously deepening the forgetfulness of Being while simultaneously clarifying the metaphysical structure of that forgetting. The irony, as Dugin makes plain, is that modernity renders nihilism more transparent. It says what metaphysics always did, but more bluntly.
The discussion then pivots to Hegel and Nietzsche. Here Dugin is especially insightful. Hegel is framed as the last great systematizer of Western metaphysics, the one who tried to close the philosophical narrative by sublimating it into the Absolute Idea. He represents the moment in which the metaphysical tradition becomes self-aware, yet still operates within the old structures concepts, categories, the referential theory of truth. Heidegger, as Dugin notes, respects Hegel’s ambition and his attention to Heraclitus, but he sees in Hegel an ultimate failure: the failure to break free of metaphysics by still thinking Being in terms of the conceptual.
Nietzsche, then, is treated not as a radical outsider, but as the final insider. The will to power, the death of God, the transvaluation of values these are not new beginnings, in Heidegger’s view, but terminal intensifications. Nietzsche, says Dugin via Heidegger, is metaphysics distilled to its most nihilistic essence. I find this assessment particularly compelling: Nietzsche’s break with tradition is only apparent. His Superman and will to power are not liberations from metaphysics but its consummations. Dugin’s phrase “accomplished End” captures this neatly. Nietzsche is both the gravedigger and the last priest of metaphysical thinking.
Thus I think in Heidegger’s view, as interpreted by Dugin, Western philosophy unfolds as a tragic arc. From the Greek inception, through medieval distortion, to modern dissolution, it is a history of deontologization a progressive forgetting and loss of Being. This process is not accidental, not correctable, and certainly not morally condemnable. It is a fate—a destiny of the Abendland, the Land of Evening. Here Dugin makes one of his most philosophically resonant points: this is not an intellectual mistake but a geographical and ontological condition. The West had to forget Being. It was bound to.
But all is not despair. Dugin then takes us to Heidegger’s later thought the notion of another Beginning, the possibility of Ereignis. Now, this part of the text, while dense, is profoundly hopeful in a dark way. Ereignis, which is often mistranslated as simply “event,” is something far more radical in Heidegger: it is the event of appropriation, of Being giving itself. Dugin is careful to stress that this new Beginning is not a return to pre-Socratic wisdom but a step forward through the End, not away from it.
This “another Beginning” is structured through paradox. Being must be thought as including nothing, as both Being and non-Being. Heidegger challenges Parmenides here: non-being is, too. The whole of Western philosophy, then, becomes a history not of Being, but of its concealment. Yet that concealment, says Dugin via Heidegger, is also a form of unconcealment. It’s negative theology applied to ontology. We know Being not through its presence, but through the marks its absence leaves.
And then there is Geviert, the fourfold—sky and earth, mortals and gods—this poetic topology drawn from Hölderlin and reoriented by Heidegger. Dugin’s inclusion of this image is apt, because it signals the turn away from conceptual thinking toward poetic dwelling. This is the sort of ontological grammar that cannot be translated into logic or epistemology. It has to be inhabited, lived.
Dugin’s reading culminates in a powerful inversion: the very darkness into which Western thought has fallen becomes the place from which a new light might emerge. But not a light of clarity—rather, a “saving power” hidden within danger itself. The fall into nihilism is not a dead end but the abyss from which a new relation to Being might emerge. The way down is the way through.
In sum, Dugin does more than summarize Heidegger; he performs a kind of metaphysical liturgy. His interpretation is passionate, mythic, and unapologetically grand. While it may lack the cautious sobriety of analytic commentary, it more than compensates with philosophical intensity. Whether one agrees with Dugin’s appropriation of Heidegger or not, it is impossible to ignore the depth and drama he brings to this reading. He asks us not just to understand philosophy, but to see its death, and maybe, just maybe, its rebirth.
Dugin's take on Heidegger is clearly eschatological(...as I have already pointed out in several occasions). His interpretation leans heavily on the idea that Heidegger points us toward an end, not just of metaphysics, but of a whole civilizational cycle. Heidegger never lays out eschatology as a structured system or apparatus, but that impulse is definitely there, especially in his later work. The Ereignis (the event) feels like a turning point, almost apocalyptic in tone, where something radically new could break through after the long night of metaphysics. Heidegger’s ontotheological critique, especially in Identität und Differenz, brings out deep tensions regarding the philosophy of History, and the history of philosophy. He exposes how Hegel, the scholastics, and early modern thinkers like Descartes are all entangled in a metaphysical framework that conceals Being; not in a progressive way, but completely topological, in spirals if we want to see it dynamically. In that sense, Heidegger comes off as more eschatological than genealogical. He is not tracing the history of values like Nietzsche does; he is calling for a rupture, a break, a new beginning altogether.
This comment provides a provocative and ambitious reading of Alexander Dugin’s interpretation of Martin Heidegger, with a focus on the eschatological dimension of Heidegger’s later thought. A detailed critique then follows, examining its philosophical framing, interpretive fidelity, strengths, and limitations.
The author asserts that Dugin’s reading of Heidegger is clearly eschatological. This is a strong claim, and it is only partially justified. Dugin, particularly in The Fourth Political Theory, engages Heidegger not as a purely ontological thinker, but as one who offers a vision for civilizational renewal or more precisely, for a final confrontation with Western nihilism. Dugin reinterprets Heidegger through a mystical-political lens, making the Ereignis into a kind of historical-ontological rupture, an event signaling not just the end of metaphysics but of the modern West itself.
However, the term eschatological needs qualification. Traditionally, eschatology implies a teleological end, a final cause or ultimate state such as in Christian theology, the end of time or the Second Coming. Heidegger himself was wary of teleology; his critique of metaphysics was precisely that it concealed Being by framing it in terms of ends, purposes, and causal explanation. So while Dugin may interpret Heidegger in this eschatological frame, it would be inaccurate to ascribe this reading to Heidegger himself without heavy caveats.
The statement risks conflating Dugin’s geopolitical-mystical project with Heidegger’s more phenomenological and ontological ambitions. The phrase Heidegger points us toward an end verges on oversimplification, unless we distinguish between Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysical ends and Dugin’s apocalyptic reterritorialization.
The author describes Ereignis, the event of appropriation, as almost apocalyptic in tone. This is an interpretively rich and partially justified claim. Heidegger’s Ereignis especially in the Contributions to Philosophy and Time and Being does signal a rupture with the history of metaphysics. It is neither a discrete event nor a linear culmination, but rather a clearing in which Being comes into its own after a long period of concealment.
Describing it as apocalyptic is poetically resonant, but possibly misleading. The apocalypse implies revealing from apokalypsis, and in this sense, it aligns with Heidegger’s vocabulary of unconcealment, aletheia. However, Heidegger resists any temporal finality or anthropocentric teleology that apocalyptic language often carries.
Framing Ereignis as apocalyptic risks obscuring its ontological subtlety. While Ereignis may feel like a rupture, Heidegger treats it as an ontological possibility that is historical but not historicist. The tone may seem eschatological, but its structure is anti-eschatological; it is not an end but a new opening, a shift in Seinsgeschichte, the history of Being.
The passage correctly emphasizes Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology, the idea that metaphysics equates Being with a supreme being such as God, subject, or idea. This critique is foundational in Identität und Differenz, where Heidegger explores the tension between identity and difference as foundational to Western metaphysics.
The assertion that this critique reveals deep tensions regarding the philosophy of History and the history of philosophy is well observed. Heidegger is concerned with how the history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche represents a progressive forgetting of Being, culminating in technological enframing, Gestell, in modernity. This forgetting is not progressive in a developmental sense but topological, as the author notes—folded, spiraling, and recursive.
The author astutely invokes topology and spiral structure. This aligns with Heidegger’s nonlinear understanding of history as epochal, not linear. The metaphor of the spiral is apt for illustrating Heidegger’s notion that Being is repeatedly approached but always withdrawn.
The contrast between Heidegger and Nietzsche is handled provocatively but somewhat schematically. Nietzsche’s genealogical method analyzes the origin and evolution of values. Heidegger critiques Nietzsche for remaining within the metaphysical tradition, even as he tries to subvert it. Heidegger believes Nietzsche merely inverts the metaphysical table rather than overturning it.
The author claims Heidegger is not tracing the history of values but calling for a rupture. This is accurate insofar as Heidegger is not engaged in moral genealogy but in ontological retrieval. Yet it misses that both thinkers are historical—Nietzsche historically deconstructs morality; Heidegger historically deconstructs ontology.
The more eschatological than genealogical binary may be rhetorically effective, but it underplays Heidegger’s own genealogical moments, especially in Nietzsche and Introduction to Metaphysics. Heidegger does trace conceptual histories—he just does so to show their ontological distortions.
The idea that Heidegger’s thought entails the end of a whole civilizational cycle fits Dugin’s interpretation more than Heidegger’s own. Dugin uses Heidegger to frame a clash of civilizations, opposing liberal modernity with a Eurasian alternative grounded in Tradition, Myth, and Destiny. For Dugin, Heidegger provides a metaphysical basis for a post-liberal, multi-polar world.
Here the author might do more to differentiate between Heidegger’s metaphysical concerns and Dugin’s ideological aims. Dugin instrumentalizes Heidegger in a way that Heidegger himself would likely resist, particularly given his deep ambivalence toward nationalism and his eventual disillusionment with political solutions.
Overall, the passage offers an insightful and imaginative interpretation of Dugin’s Heidegger, but it tends to blur Heidegger’s ontological precision with Dugin’s eschatological mysticism. Its strengths lie in noticing the tone of Heidegger’s later work, invoking Ereignis and ontotheology with sensitivity, and articulating a rich topological metaphor for Heidegger’s history of Being.
Its limitations include slipping into a rhetorical conflation of Heidegger and Dugin, using eschatological in ways that risk mischaracterizing Heidegger’s anti-teleological stance, and underplaying the subtle genealogical aspects of Heidegger’s historical critique.
To refine this passage further, it would help to differentiate between Heidegger’s ontology of rupture and Dugin’s geopolitical eschaton, while preserving the rhetorical intensity of the original.
The thing is even Heidegger still stood without what he would usher in. Ultimately all he had were more ideas of the Next. It did take a German to embody it, in the research of Goethe we already have a beginning experience of the identity of being and thought/'interiority' in his experience of the Urplanze, and his colour investigations. It took an Austrian, in R. Steiner, to make a science of this, and it should have taken some Anglos to make it mundane, industried, and commercial rather than only more individual, substantial, and articulated. But this has not been forthcoming, perhaps we will have to wait for the returning tide back to the european East, slavs, or Russians, who will manage to transmute their current tendancy to ritualize it. Transmute RS's work into a re-sacralized scientia... a profoundly human wisdom full of technique and practic.
It’s so wonderful to see the pre-sagement of Rudolf Steiner here (despite the fact he was dead already, his work hovered, still hovers, waiting to be activated in the Darkness). “We have presented the human being as resting upon his own foundation, both in thinking and in action. We have designated his world of ideas as coinciding with the world fundament…”. Being and Idea in identity.
I need to express appreciation of your exposition. The bodies are piling up in the sequential episodes of Heidegger where the eventful fourth body bag makes the home coming.
The resemblance to the first part of the series is slim. But each presents a different facet.
I have just begun a series providing an overview of the philosophy of history from a phenomenological perspective on my profile
I so appreciate this thoughtful overview of the trajectory of Western European philosophical thought. It has cleared up a lot of fuzzy understandings for me, tied up in a very neat package. With morning tea in hand and notepaper and pen, a lot has been cleared up for my understanding and we will be printing it for further clarity. Thank you. (Krys)
That tendency towards nihilism is peculiar. I have been finding, taking this back towards faith, the choice is always death of faith or death in faith. We have a choice. In one, we fall out of the divine. With the other, I think, we fall into the divine which is the path of meaning.