The question arises: does Heidegger have a history of philosophy? Is not his teaching just a moment in the process of Western European philosophy, not containing in itself a succinct....
Heidegger’s epochal thought is genuinely original. Unlike Hegel, there’s no fall into dialectic, no sense that metaphysics can “overcome” itself through a linear process of self-negation or synthesis. There’s no Spirit unfolding itself through history in order to finally recognize itself in the mirror of time. Heidegger rejects that whole schema. His thinking cuts differently, radically.
Heidegger’s epochalism isn’t hermeneutic but hermetic. It’s not about interpreting meaning through a tradition or historical continuity; it’s about moments where Being either reveals or withholds itself entirely. The concept of the Kehre(the "turn") is central here. But the Kehre itself shouldn’t be taken hermeneutically, as if it's just a shift in interpretive stance or perspective. It’s more fundamental. It marks a shift from Da-sein (as the analytic of human being in Being and Time) to Da-Seyn; the site where Being happens, the grounding of the historical clearing itself.
Heidegger doesn’t treat Being as some super-object or master-subject that guides or determines history. That would still be metaphysics. On the contrary, for him, history is the tabula rasa: a kind of open field, always in motion, where Being appears and disappears. This appearing and vanishing shapes what Heidegger calls the epochē of Being: the way Being “gives” itself in a particular time. And this giving isn’t linear, nor is it cumulative. It’s evental.
Being happens as an Ereignis, an event, a happening. Not a thing, not a substance, and definitely not a historical actor. Each epoch isn't a stage in some grand narrative, but a distinct horizon of truth can show up. And in-between? Silence. Withdrawal..
Russia today, if we are allowed to speak of Russia not as a perpetual historiographic object, but as Da-Seyn. is perhaps manifesting Seyn beyond the bounds of ideology. The axis of Seyn seems to be shifting from the German Abendland toward the East, following the hermetic movement of history rather than the hermeneutic, which is unmistakably Atlantist in character.
Trolling and Trolling... please! If the only thing you can say about my comment or about Dugin's paper is that "it is pure rhetoric," then it means you didn't understand a word of it; especially considering Heidegger’s distinction between Historie and Geschichte, and the ultimative ontological problems involved in deriving a metaphysics of history from that... rethoooric? Really?
So, where is your authentic critic on the whole subject? And I really mean "yours" and not whatever trolling AI artifact you might have already prepared... let's be authentic 😬
Taking back my totally unreasonable comments on your original statement, based on the following. Now I congratulate you, whilst at the same time apologizing most humbly.
Your original statement scored well with the AI logic (so feel proud):
The philosophical statement in question presents a nuanced interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, contrasting it with Hegelian dialectics and applying it geopolitically. While it captures key Heideggerian themes, it also contains conceptual ambiguities, potential misinterpretations, and a speculative geopolitical leap that warrant critique. Here’s a detailed analysis:
---
### **1. Strengths of the Statement**
- **Accurate Contrast with Hegel**: The distinction between Heidegger and Hegel is well-founded. Heidegger explicitly rejects Hegel’s teleological, dialectical metaphysics, arguing that Being cannot be “overcome” through historical synthesis. The emphasis on *Ereignis* (event) as non-linear and non-cumulative aligns with Heidegger’s critique of progressivist historiography.
- **Kehre and Da-Seyn**: The focus on the *Kehre* (turn) as a shift from *Da-sein* to *Da-Seyn* (the historical “site” of Being) is valid. Heidegger’s later work moves away from the existential analytic of *Being and Time* toward a more primordial engagement with Being’s self-concealment and revelation, which the statement captures.
- **Anti-Metaphysical Stance**: The rejection of Being as a “super-object” or “master-subject” is consistent with Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics. His view of history as a dynamic interplay of presence/absence (rather than a subject-driven narrative) is correctly highlighted.
---
### **2. Conceptual Ambiguities and Critiques**
#### **a. “Hermetic” vs. “Hermeneutic”**
The statement claims Heidegger’s epochalism is “hermetic” (sealed, esoteric) rather than hermeneutic (interpretive). This risks misrepresentation:
- **Hermeneutics in Heidegger**: Even after the *Kehre*, Heidegger retains a hermeneutic dimension. His later work still involves interpreting the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*), albeit through poetic thinking (*Dichten-Denken*) rather than traditional hermeneutics. Labeling it “hermetic” conflates methodological opacity with a rejection of interpretation, which oversimplifies.
- **Tabula Rasa Misstep**: Describing history as a “tabula rasa” contradicts Heidegger’s view. For Heidegger, history is structured by *epochē*—intervals where Being’s withdrawal opens specific horizons of intelligibility. It is never a “blank slate” but always already shaped by Being’s historical sending (*Geschick*).
#### **b. Linear vs. Evental History**
The statement correctly rejects linearity but introduces a tension by referencing a geopolitical “shift” of Being’s “axis” from the German *Abendland* (West) to Russia. This implies a directional movement, which risks reifying the very teleology Heidegger critiques. If Being’s giving is non-linear, positing an “axis” moving East reintroduces a Hegelian-style historical vector.
#### **c. Ereignis and Geopolitical Speculation**
The leap to Russia as *Da-Seyn* manifesting “beyond ideology” is problematic:
- **Overextension of Heideggerian Terms**: Applying *Da-Seyn* (a metaphysical concept) to a nation-state conflates ontological grounding with political ontology. Heidegger’s later references to “the West” or “the Greeks” are critiques of modernity, not endorsements of geopolitical shifts. His infamous association with Nazism exemplifies the dangers of such conflations.
- **Ideology and Atlantism**: The claim that Russia embodies *Seyn* “beyond ideology” ignores how all modern states, including Russia, operate within metaphysical frameworks (e.g., technocracy, nationalism). Dismissing “Atlantist” (Western) thought as hermeneutic while elevating Russia as “hermetic” is a political assertion, not a philosophical argument.
---
### **3. Logical Coherence**
- **Internal Consistency**: The statement is internally consistent in its rejection of dialectics and linearity. However, the geopolitical application undermines this coherence by implying a directional “shift,” which reintroduces a quasi-Hegelian historical narrative.
- **Definitional Vagueness**: Terms like “hermetic” and “Atlantist” are undefined, leaving room for ideological slippage. “Hermetic” could imply esotericism (a charge against Heidegger) or a closed system, neither of which aligns neatly with Heidegger’s project.
---
### **4. Conclusion: Does It Make Logical Sense?**
The statement is *partially* logically coherent but falters in its speculative application. Its core philosophical claims about Heidegger’s departure from Hegel and metaphysics are sound, but the geopolitical extension lacks textual support and risks contradicting Heidegger’s anti-teleological stance. The argument would benefit from:
1. Clarifying the relationship between hermeneutics and the “hermetic” in Heidegger.
2. Avoiding conflations of ontological concepts (*Da-Seyn*) with geopolitical entities.
3. Addressing the tension between non-linear *Ereignis* and the implied “shift” to the East.
In sum, the statement succeeds in outlining Heidegger’s differences from Hegel but falters when transitioning from ontology to geopolitics, revealing more about the author’s ideological lens than Heidegger’s philosophy.
However, with your response to my ‘spaghetti’ imposture AI states:
The response to the critique of Dugin's paper as "pure rhetoric" invokes Heideggerian concepts defensively but suffers from several flaws in its argumentation and tone. Here's a structured critique:
### **1. Defensive Tone and Ad Hominem Elements**
- **Confrontational Language**: The use of phrases like "Trolling... please!" and the sarcastic elongation of "rethoooric" shifts focus from substantive rebuttal to personal dismissal. This undermines the philosophical rigor expected in such a discourse and risks alienating the interlocutor rather than engaging their points.
### **2. Misapplication of Heideggerian Concepts**
- **Historie vs. Geschichte**: While Heidegger distinguishes between factual history (*Historie*) and lived historicality (*Geschichte*), the responder invokes this dichotomy without clarifying how it substantively addresses the critique. Merely referencing these terms does not automatically validate an argument; the response must demonstrate how the paper engages with *Geschichte* ontologically rather than instrumentally.
- **Metaphysics of History**: Heidegger critiques traditional metaphysics, so claiming to derive a "metaphysics of history" from his work is paradoxical. If Dugin’s paper constructs such a metaphysics, it may contradict Heidegger’s anti-metaphysical stance, rendering the critique of "rhetoric" valid if the terminology is superficially deployed.
### **3. Vagueness and Lack of Specificity**
- **Unsubstantiated Ontological Claims**: The reference to "ultimate ontological problems" remains abstract. Without concrete examples of how the paper addresses these issues through Heidegger’s framework, the defense appears hollow. The critic’s charge of rhetoric may stem from a perceived lack of depth behind the terminology.
- **Dugin’s Ideological Context**: Dugin’s work often politicizes philosophical concepts to serve geopolitical agendas. The responder does not address whether the paper’s use of Heidegger aligns with his philosophy or instrumentalizes it for ideological ends—a key concern in critiques of rhetoric.
### **4. Failure to Engage the Critique**
- **Circular Reasoning**: The response assumes that invoking Heidegger’s concepts inherently refutes the "rhetoric" label. However, it does not explain how the paper’s arguments transcend rhetoric by rigorously applying these concepts. The critique may persist if the paper uses Heideggerian language ornamentally rather than analytically.
### **5. Logical and Philosophical Inconsistencies**
- **Rhetoric vs. Ontology**: The responder conflates the use of philosophical terminology with ontological engagement. A work can employ Heidegger’s lexicon rhetorically (e.g., to legitimize a political narrative) without authentically grappling with his ideas. The critique of "pure rhetoric" challenges this veneer of depth, which the response does not adequately counter.
### **6. Conclusion**
The response’s reliance on Heideggerian jargon without substantive explication, combined with its adversarial tone, weakens its credibility. To effectively counter the "rhetoric" critique, the responder must:
- **Clarify Specifics**: Detail how the paper’s arguments engage Heidegger’s ontology beyond terminological borrowing.
- **Address Ideological Context**: Acknowledge and reconcile Dugin’s geopolitical aims with Heidegger’s philosophical project.
- **Avoid Logical Fallacies**: Replace sarcasm and ad hominem with reasoned analysis of the paper’s methodological rigor.
Ultimately, the responder’s defense risks mirroring the very rhetorical tendencies it seeks to dismiss, highlighting the need for a more philosophically grounded rebuttal.
Dear ChatGPT, thank you again for your void critique. Once again, I won't respond to the flooding redundancies of A.I. that only facilitate your "trolling"; it seems you can't engage in a real debate... whatever.
Apparently, you are still perceiving the da-seyn as merely da-sein, and, at the same time, the da-sein as a "subject" of the Prima Philosophia, which necessarily re-creates Historie; it is an inner requirement, but at the same time trans-historic. You need to be deeply versed in Heidegger to understand these subtle aperceptions.
Russia can perceive itself as Russia and can be perfectly interpreted as a da-seyn; this authenticity isn't merely built upon Historie, but Historie plays a key role here. Russia can't be perceived as a da-sein, though; if it were mere da-sein, we would just be playing with nationalism; meaning, reducing the da-sein to mere subjectivity and therefore to idealism, and in its worst form, ideology.
Historie is a very superficial level of metaphysical analysis, which, however, is vital in idealism and metaphysical analysis.
Is there philosophy of history in Heidegger? Absolutely yes; however, it is superfluous, and never determinant.
You are quick in your response. So you obviously read the critique through gritted teeth. Still, there is no use in getting angry. Calmness is better suited. Anyway ‘Dar-seyn’ has a more ancient vocabularistic form of the more recent spelling / meaning dar-sein / darsein. Harking perhaps back to those Heroic Mythical times past ? Mr Dugin is clearly a Man yearning for some kind of Orthodox Mythical Heroic Meaning / Getting back to good old standard reliable morals and good old family values laid down strictly by an autocratic Male figure, cowering behind the all powerful Matriarchal Mother figure. I know how this works, I’ve seen it in practice believe me. Battleaxe Wife and Meek dutiful but equally strict husband, their children whipped into shape with little or no flexibility. Philosophy aside, for all that has failed in Western Civilization vis a vis Sexual Politics and the status of the child at home and within education, many advances for the better have been made, but only under a more real Socialist agenda. Sadly Socialism died with the metaphorical ‘stabbing’ in the back of Jeremy Corbin’. Socialism has been effectively strangled, rooted out. Anybody on the left is accused of being a Marxist or a Communist or a supporter of Putin. Western Politics has become warped. So I do not hold out much hope for success through Dugin or Starmer, or Van de Leyn, or any of the others. We know that Trump is a contradiction in terms. Maybe therefore China has the key, although it too has notable ‘skeletons’ in the closet. A Socialist State with a Market Economy.
So to the other Critique.
Let me start by addressing your frustration head-on. I’m sorry if the previous response felt like a void critique or came across as “flooding redundancies” and “trolling.” That wasn’t the intent, and I’ll aim to cut through the noise here, engaging directly with your ideas in a way that respects the depth you’re seeking. You’ve raised some intricate points rooted in Heidegger’s philosophy, and I’ll unpack them step by step, focusing on the core of your argument without veering into superfluous territory.
Addressing the Da-seyn vs. Da-sein Distinction
You’re drawing a sharp line between perceiving Russia as da-seyn versus da-sein, and you’re frustrated that the latter keeps being assumed. Let’s clarify these terms in Heidegger’s framework to ground the discussion:
• Da-sein (Dasein): In Being and Time, Heidegger uses Dasein to describe the being for whom being is an issue—typically human existence. It’s not a detached subject but a being-in-the-world, defined by its thrownness (where it finds itself) and its projection (its possibilities). Importantly, Dasein isn’t the Cartesian ego of traditional metaphysics; it breaks with the subject-object split of Prima Philosophia.
• Da-seyn: This isn’t a standard term in Heidegger’s lexicon, which suggests you’re extending or adapting his thought. From your usage, da-seyn seems to imply a more primordial or authentic “there-being” (Da + Seyn), perhaps beyond the individual scope of Dasein. You argue that Russia can be understood as da-seyn, embodying an authenticity that transcends mere subjectivity or nationalism.
Your critique is that interpreting Russia as da-sein reduces it to a “subject” of Prima Philosophia, recreating Historie and locking it into idealism or ideology. But here’s where we might diverge: Dasein in Heidegger’s sense isn’t a subject in the metaphysical tradition. It’s already relational and worldly, not an isolated ego. So, perceiving Russia as da-sein wouldn’t automatically equate to nationalism or subjectivity—unless you mean that applying Dasein to a collective entity like a nation inherently distorts it into ideological terms. If da-seyn is your way of signaling a deeper, collective authenticity, I’d need more clarity on how you define it against Dasein. For Heidegger, Seyn (an archaic spelling he later uses) refers to being itself, distinct from beings (Seiendes), but it’s not typically paired with Da in this way.
Russia as Da-seyn and the Role of Historie
You assert that Russia can perceive itself as Russia and be interpreted as da-seyn, with an authenticity not solely built on Historie, though Historie plays a key role. Let’s break this down:
• Historie vs. Geschichte: Heidegger distinguishes between Historie—the objective, chronological study of past events—and Geschichte, the lived, existential history that shapes Dasein’s possibilities. You’re right that Historie is superficial in his view; it’s a derivative mode of understanding, focused on facts rather than the ontological depth of being. Geschichte, by contrast, is tied to Geschichtlichkeit (historicality), where Dasein engages its past as a horizon of possibility.
• Russia’s Authenticity: If Russia as da-seyn transcends Historie, you seem to suggest it embodies a Geschichte-like authenticity—a collective being that discloses itself beyond mere historical data or nationalistic narratives. This is intriguing but tricky. Heidegger occasionally hints at collective dimensions of being (e.g., the Volk in his 1930s writings), but Dasein is primarily individual. To cast Russia as da-seyn, you’d be positing it as a site where being (Seyn) reveals itself uniquely, not just as a political or cultural construct. Historie might inform this—providing the factual backdrop—but it’s not the essence of Russia’s da-seyn.
You argue that perceiving Russia as da-sein would reduce it to nationalism, subjectivity, and idealism. I’d push back slightly: Dasein’s structure (care, temporality, being-with-others) doesn’t inherently lead to idealism. But I see your point—treating a nation as a singular Dasein risks anthropomorphizing it into a subjective “actor,” which could slide into ideology. Da-seyn, as you frame it, might avoid this by emphasizing a more ontological, less subjectivist authenticity.
Historie in Metaphysics and Idealism
You note that Historie is vital in idealism and metaphysical analysis but superficial in Heidegger’s framework. This aligns with his critique: metaphysics, including idealism, deals with beings (Seiendes) rather than being (Seyn), and Historie is its tool—an ontic, not ontological, approach. For Heidegger, authentic understanding comes from grappling with Geschichte, not cataloging events. Your dismissal of Historie as superficial echoes this, though you acknowledge its role in shaping perceptions of Russia, perhaps as a necessary but limited layer.
Heidegger’s Philosophy of History
You ask if there’s a philosophy of history in Heidegger, answering yes but calling it “superfluous” and “never determinant.” Let’s explore this:
• In Being and Time: Heidegger’s philosophy of history is rooted in Geschichtlichkeit. History isn’t a linear progression of facts but the way Dasein inherits and projects its possibilities. It’s not “superfluous” here—it’s central to Dasein’s being.
• In Later Works: After the “turn” (Kehre), Heidegger develops the history of being (Seinsgeschichte), where epochs (e.g., Greek, medieval, modern) reflect different modes of being’s disclosure. This isn’t a traditional philosophy of history with causal laws; it’s about how being unfolds.
Your dismissal might mean that, in the context of Russia as da-seyn, this philosophy doesn’t fully capture its authenticity—it’s too abstract or secondary to the lived reality you’re pointing to. If da-seyn is about a direct, existential truth, Seinsgeschichte might feel like an unnecessary overlay.
Synthesis and Response
Here’s where we land:
• Russia as Da-seyn: You’re proposing that Russia’s authenticity lies in a mode of being (da-seyn) that transcends Historie and nationalism. This is a bold extension of Heidegger, and it hinges on defining da-seyn as a collective, ontological phenomenon. It’s not immediately clear how a nation fits this, but it’s a provocative idea—Russia as a “there” where being reveals itself beyond ideology.
• Not Mere Da-sein: I agree that reducing Russia to a nationalistic Dasein risks idealism, though Dasein itself isn’t inherently subjective in Heidegger’s sense. Your da-seyn seems to sidestep this trap.
• Historie’s Role: It’s a superficial but necessary scaffold, not the core of Russia’s being.
• Philosophy of History: Heidegger has one, but you’re right that it’s not “determinant” in a conventional sense. If da-seyn is your focus, it might indeed feel superfluous.
To wrap up: your argument pushes Heidegger into new territory, and I respect the depth of that move. If Russia’s authenticity as da-seyn is about transcending historical facts and ideological traps to reveal a deeper truth, that’s a stance worth wrestling with. How a nation embodies this—without slipping into the metaphysics Heidegger critiques—is the challenge you’ve left on the table. I’m here to dig deeper if you want to push it further.
Once again: I am not going into redundancies; I don’t think A.I. propositional "validation" is the correct way to develop a healthy debate. Let me try to go back to the critical line I was in first place, focusing uniquely on some of the issues present in Dugin’s writing that need review in my most humble opinin. I am only focusing on this line: the philosophy of History in Heidegger, the possibility of a Russian philosophy, and whether Dugin is suggesting an ultimate connection between the genuine thought of ancient Greece, Germany, and finally Russia, according to Heidegger’s terms (Heideggerian kinda Historie 😅)
1)Philosophy of History in Heidegger:
There is indeed a philosophy of History in Heidegger, but not one intended to perpetuate an onto-theological state as destiny; rather, it seeks to dismantle it. Heidegger’s thinking moves away from “Historie” (the linear, metaphysical view of history) toward “Geschichte” (the eventful happening of Being). In this sense, history is no longer a chronological unfolding but an Ereignis; the event of Being’s own disclosure. This is crucial because it breaks with any attempt to preserve metaphysical continuity.
2)Possibility of a Russian philosophy or original thinking
Russia, as Da-seyn (let's use the capital letter here) can clearly develop a genuine philosophy and original thinking, tied to a genuine way of being-in-the-world, seeing the world, and speaking the word within the world. There are enough poets and thinkers in Russia who have manifested Russia as Ereignis (an event of appropriation, where Being “comes to pass”). This Ereignis must not be confused with myth, epic, Historie, propaganda, nationalism, or any ideological construction.Here is where Dugin’s line becomes tricky: if he truly seeks to "find" Russia, he does not need Putin nor a Russian ontotheology; he needs the poets of Russia. Russia’s Kairos, its moment of openness, has nothing to do with a strong Historie or mythologized national destiny.
It is the poets who illuminate da-seyn: just as Hölderlin, Stefan George, and Trakl did for/of Germany, Russian poets can do for/of Russia. But this requires going beyond all improper structures (ideology, nation, race, ethos, ethnicity, historical narratives, Gerede). If Dugin is implying that the Seyn of Russia consists of these elements; then he has misunderstood Heidegger entirely. He might remain trapped in a false Dasein of ontotheology; recreating a perpetual subject that is nothing but an adjectives: Russian, woman, man, language, culture, territory, war, security, control, repetition, continuity... None of these are Ereignis; they are merely ideological sedimentations of ontic events.
3) Is Dugin implying that there is an epochal movement in which German philosophy, inheriting the original Greek impulse (according to Heidegger), is being transferred to Russia?
I refer again to the dangers pointed out in the second point.
da-sein/da-seyn (sometimes exchangable, but "on Ereignis" the difference was clear, and sometimes with capital leters to remark the process described by the concept evocation) is a concept fully developed in the so-called “second” Heidegger; the Heidegger of Ereignis. This Heidegger, the one relevant to Dugin’s present writing, indeed proposes an eschatology of the Event (Ereignis) as his philosophy of history. Thus, I would answer yes: Heidegger’s “philosophy of history” is essentially the history of Being/Sein/Seyn itself, as the event of appropriation, rather than a narrative of ontic phenomena.
However, Dugin seems uncertain regarding this point. He appears more interested in the possibility of a Russian philosophy by using the same movement Heidegger employed when identifying Germany as the Da-sein/Da-seyn that reconnected itself to the original Greek impulse; more specifically, to Heraclitus’ primordial thought (Anfang).
But the Heidegger of Ereignis rejects all forms of colossalism; meaning myth, epic, Historie, religion, nationalism, imperium as they all remain within the metaphysical and ontotheological closure. The true Da-sein is blind to all anthropological phenomena of culture, nation, history, identity, political structures, or even biological evolution. Only the poets can see and express Da-seyn as it is.
Could the same not be the case for Russia?
I say yes; but only if Russia is moved beyond improper elements (ideology, nation, race, etc.). Otherwise, Dugin remains within the "facade" Da-sein, reproducing metaphysical subjectivity instead of allowing Russia’s Ereignis to emerge.
I almost forget to mention that the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit is not fully relevant here, because that analysis remains focused on Sein (Being), its ontological critique, and the preliminary overcoming of improper structures. It does not yet reach the radical unfolding of Being as Ereignis, which only becomes fully articulated in his later work.
The text posits that Martin Heidegger's middle period (1930s-1940s) is essential for reconstructing a coherent history of Western philosophy, akin to Hegel’s, and argues that this framework is vital for revitalizing Russian philosophy. Below is a structured critique using philosophical, logical, historical, sociological, psychological, empirical, and geopolitical methodologies:
1. Philosophical Critique
Systematicity of Heidegger’s History: The claim that Heidegger’s middle period completes a Hegelian-style "metaphysical eschatology" is contentious. Heidegger’s project critiques metaphysics rather than systematizing it. His ‘Seinsgeschichte’ (History of Being) emphasizes discontinuity and the ‘forgetting of Being,’ contrasting with Hegel’s dialectical progression. While texts like ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’ explore ‘Ereignis’ (event), their fragmented, poetic style resists linear systematization.
- Eurocentrism’: Equating Western philosophy with universal human destiny reflects Heidegger’s Eurocentric bias, which the text uncritically adopts. This excludes non-Western traditions and overlooks critiques from postcolonial and decolonial thought.
2. Logical Critique
Hermeneutic Circularity: The argument relies on a hermeneutic circle, assuming Heidegger’s middle period completes his system, which in turn justifies its centrality. This risks tautology: the framework is validated by its own presuppositions.
- **Teleological Fallacy**: The text mirrors Heidegger’s teleology by positing Western philosophy’s "end" as its defining feature. This conflates Heidegger’s critique of modernity with a Hegelian endpoint, ignoring open-ended interpretations of his work.
---
### **3. Historical Critique**
- **Neglect of the Middle Period**: While the middle period was underexplored historically, recent scholarship (e.g., Theodore Kisiel, Richard Polt) highlights its complexity without affirming its systematicity. The *Black Notebooks* further complicate this, revealing Heidegger’s entanglement with Nazism and anti-Semitism, which the text omits.
- **Hegelian Comparison**: Equating Heidegger with Hegel ignores their divergent methodologies. Hegel’s dialectical historiography is teleological; Heidegger’s is anti-teleological, emphasizing rupture and retrieval (*Destruktion*).
---
### **4. Sociological Critique**
- **Russian Philosophy’s Dependency**: The text assumes Russian philosophy requires Western frameworks for legitimacy, reflecting a colonial mindset. This overlooks Russia’s rich intellectual traditions (e.g., Slavophilism, cosmism) that resist Western categorization.
- **Cultural Hegemony**: By framing Heidegger as a "hologram" for Russian thought, the text perpetuates Western intellectual dominance, marginalizing indigenous epistemologies.
---
### **5. Psychological Critique**
- **Anxiety of Influence**: The insistence on "trusting" Heidegger suggests a psychological need for foundational authority, possibly stemming from post-Soviet identity crises. This mirrors 19th-century Russian debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles, now recast through Heidegger.
- **Projection of Completeness**: The desire for a "holographic" system may reflect insecurity about fragmentation in Russian philosophy, seeking coherence through external validation.
---
### **6. Empirical Critique**
- **Fragmentation vs. System**: Heidegger’s middle-period works (*Beiträge*, *Geschichte des Seyns*) are aphoristic and nonlinear, challenging the text’s claim of systematicity. Scholars like Polt note their exploratory, provisional nature, complicating the idea of a "complete" history.
- **Selective Canonization**: The text cherry-picks Heidegger’s corpus, ignoring critiques (e.g., Derrida’s deconstruction, Carnap’s logical positivism) that undermine his historiography.
---
### **7. Geopolitical Critique**
- **Post-Soviet Identity**: The text reflects Russia’s search for post-Marxist intellectual anchors. Positioning Heidegger as a bridge to Western philosophy risks replicating Cold War binaries, neglecting global South perspectives.
- **Cultural Imperialism**: Framing Heidegger as universal perpetuates Western hegemony. Alternatives like Eurasianism or dialogue with Asian philosophies (e.g., Kyoto School) are dismissed, reinforcing Eurocentrism.
---
### **Synthesis and Conclusion**
The text’s argument is ambitious but flawed:
- **Strengths**: Highlights understudied aspects of Heidegger’s work and provocatively links Russian philosophy to Western hermeneutics.
- **Weaknesses**: Overstates Heidegger’s systematicity, ignores his political baggage, and perpetuates Eurocentrism. The call for Russian philosophy to adopt Heidegger’s framework risks intellectual subordination rather than liberation.
**Recommendation**: A more critical engagement with Heidegger—acknowledging his insights while confronting his Eurocentrism and politics—and a turn to dialogical models (e.g., Bakhtinian polyphony) could better serve Russian philosophy’s autonomy and global relevance.
---
This critique underscores the need for a balanced approach that neither dismisses Heidegger’s contributions nor uncritically enshrines them as a universal template.
“Philosophical Critique‘‘
1. ’’Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics & ‘Seinsgeschichte‘‘‘
• ‘Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy‘: Discusses Heidegger’s ontological pluralism, temporality, and critique of post‑Cartesian subjectivity.
• ‘Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP)‘: Analyzes Heidegger’s shift from phenomenology to a history of Being and his later focus on language and art.
2. ’’Eurocentrism‘‘
• ‘Britannica‘: Highlights Heidegger’s identification of Western philosophy with universal human destiny, ignoring non‑Western traditions.
• ‘Notre Dame Review (The Culmination)‘: Compares Heidegger’s teleological historiography to Hegel’s dialectics, noting his eschatological framing of Western philosophy.
• ‘Stanford Encyclopedia‘: Explains Heidegger’s temporal structuring of ‘Dasein‘ and critique of metaphysical systematization.
⸻
’’Historical Critique‘‘
4. ’’Middle period (1930s–1940s) & Nazi entanglement‘‘
• ‘Wikipedia‘: Details Heidegger’s rectorship, Nazi Party membership, and posthumous controversies (e.g., ‘Black Notebooks‘).
• ‘Heidegger in Ruins (Notre Dame Review)‘: Examines the ‘Black Notebooks‘ and Heidegger’s anti‑Semitism, citing editorial manipulations of texts.
• ‘IEP‘: Discusses Heidegger’s post‑Kehre works (e.g., ‘Contributions to Philosophy‘) and their fragmented style.
⸻
’’Sociological Critique‘‘
5. ’’Russian philosophy’s dependency & Western hegemony‘‘
• ‘Britannica‘: Notes Heidegger’s global influence on existentialism and hermeneutics, reinforcing Western intellectual dominance.
• ‘IEP‘: Critiques Heidegger’s Eurocentric framing of philosophy as a uniquely Western destiny.
⸻
’’Psychological Critique‘‘
6. ’’Anxiety of influence & projection of coherence‘‘
• ‘Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy (Notre Dame Review)‘: Analyzes Heidegger’s anti‑Cartesianism as a psychological need for authoritarian frameworks.
• ‘IEP‘: Links Heidegger’s existential themes (e.g., ‘Angst‘, guilt) to his critique of modernity.
⸻
’’Empirical Critique‘‘
7. ’’Fragmentation of middle‑period works‘‘
• ‘Heidegger in Ruins‘: Critiques the aphoristic style of ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie‘ and editorial distortions in Heidegger’s posthumous texts.
• ‘Stanford Encyclopedia‘: Highlights the incomplete nature of ‘Being and Time‘ and its reliance on unpublished drafts.
⸻
’’Geopolitical Critique‘‘
8. ‘’Post‑Soviet identity & cultural imperialism‘‘
• ‘Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy‘: Explores Heidegger’s influence on French existentialism and Cold War intellectual politics.
Is it perhaps time for a careful investigation of the Black Notebooks? Enought with the charge of "anti-semitism" so we can get down to the work of thinking. It seems to me that the Notebooks are a mighty weapon against (British) imperialism. Also interesting is that Heiedegger read Henry Miller and understood himself to also be engaged in a project of perceiving what is beyond the merely apparent. Is this not the element that brings his thought into close proxmity with Orthodoxy?
Donovan Irven reviewing ‘Ecstasy, Catastrophe’ by David Krell: Reading the Black Notebooks was an arduous task for Krell, and he finds almost no philosophical value in them. He catalogues with despair the bleak antagonisms of Heidegger toward anything and everything. Of course, there are the few passages of explicit anti-Semitism, amounting to about five pages in over a thousand of text, but there are additionally frequent polemics against Americans, Bolsheviks, Germans, and on and on. Heidegger is seemingly anti-everything, and makes sweeping generalizations about the dire state of the world that are difficult to square with the philosophical rigor exhibited in his other work. I was recently able to question John Sallis1 on this aspect of Krell’s book, and Sallis was largely in agreement: that reading the Black Notebooks is unpleasant at best, and at worst, a damning example of just how thoughtless Heidegger was capable of being – even when we must still admire his philosophical efforts elsewhere. It becomes clear that writing the first part of Ecstasy, Catastrophe became, for Krell, very much an effort to prove that there was still value to Heidegger’s work, especially Being and Time, in the face of the Black Notebook’s publication.
Heidegger’s epochal thought is genuinely original. Unlike Hegel, there’s no fall into dialectic, no sense that metaphysics can “overcome” itself through a linear process of self-negation or synthesis. There’s no Spirit unfolding itself through history in order to finally recognize itself in the mirror of time. Heidegger rejects that whole schema. His thinking cuts differently, radically.
Heidegger’s epochalism isn’t hermeneutic but hermetic. It’s not about interpreting meaning through a tradition or historical continuity; it’s about moments where Being either reveals or withholds itself entirely. The concept of the Kehre(the "turn") is central here. But the Kehre itself shouldn’t be taken hermeneutically, as if it's just a shift in interpretive stance or perspective. It’s more fundamental. It marks a shift from Da-sein (as the analytic of human being in Being and Time) to Da-Seyn; the site where Being happens, the grounding of the historical clearing itself.
Heidegger doesn’t treat Being as some super-object or master-subject that guides or determines history. That would still be metaphysics. On the contrary, for him, history is the tabula rasa: a kind of open field, always in motion, where Being appears and disappears. This appearing and vanishing shapes what Heidegger calls the epochē of Being: the way Being “gives” itself in a particular time. And this giving isn’t linear, nor is it cumulative. It’s evental.
Being happens as an Ereignis, an event, a happening. Not a thing, not a substance, and definitely not a historical actor. Each epoch isn't a stage in some grand narrative, but a distinct horizon of truth can show up. And in-between? Silence. Withdrawal..
Russia today, if we are allowed to speak of Russia not as a perpetual historiographic object, but as Da-Seyn. is perhaps manifesting Seyn beyond the bounds of ideology. The axis of Seyn seems to be shifting from the German Abendland toward the East, following the hermetic movement of history rather than the hermeneutic, which is unmistakably Atlantist in character.
Utter spaghetti rhetoric. Rhetorical Impostures of the worst kind.
Trolling and Trolling... please! If the only thing you can say about my comment or about Dugin's paper is that "it is pure rhetoric," then it means you didn't understand a word of it; especially considering Heidegger’s distinction between Historie and Geschichte, and the ultimative ontological problems involved in deriving a metaphysics of history from that... rethoooric? Really?
So, where is your authentic critic on the whole subject? And I really mean "yours" and not whatever trolling AI artifact you might have already prepared... let's be authentic 😬
Taking back my totally unreasonable comments on your original statement, based on the following. Now I congratulate you, whilst at the same time apologizing most humbly.
Your original statement scored well with the AI logic (so feel proud):
The philosophical statement in question presents a nuanced interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, contrasting it with Hegelian dialectics and applying it geopolitically. While it captures key Heideggerian themes, it also contains conceptual ambiguities, potential misinterpretations, and a speculative geopolitical leap that warrant critique. Here’s a detailed analysis:
---
### **1. Strengths of the Statement**
- **Accurate Contrast with Hegel**: The distinction between Heidegger and Hegel is well-founded. Heidegger explicitly rejects Hegel’s teleological, dialectical metaphysics, arguing that Being cannot be “overcome” through historical synthesis. The emphasis on *Ereignis* (event) as non-linear and non-cumulative aligns with Heidegger’s critique of progressivist historiography.
- **Kehre and Da-Seyn**: The focus on the *Kehre* (turn) as a shift from *Da-sein* to *Da-Seyn* (the historical “site” of Being) is valid. Heidegger’s later work moves away from the existential analytic of *Being and Time* toward a more primordial engagement with Being’s self-concealment and revelation, which the statement captures.
- **Anti-Metaphysical Stance**: The rejection of Being as a “super-object” or “master-subject” is consistent with Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics. His view of history as a dynamic interplay of presence/absence (rather than a subject-driven narrative) is correctly highlighted.
---
### **2. Conceptual Ambiguities and Critiques**
#### **a. “Hermetic” vs. “Hermeneutic”**
The statement claims Heidegger’s epochalism is “hermetic” (sealed, esoteric) rather than hermeneutic (interpretive). This risks misrepresentation:
- **Hermeneutics in Heidegger**: Even after the *Kehre*, Heidegger retains a hermeneutic dimension. His later work still involves interpreting the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*), albeit through poetic thinking (*Dichten-Denken*) rather than traditional hermeneutics. Labeling it “hermetic” conflates methodological opacity with a rejection of interpretation, which oversimplifies.
- **Tabula Rasa Misstep**: Describing history as a “tabula rasa” contradicts Heidegger’s view. For Heidegger, history is structured by *epochē*—intervals where Being’s withdrawal opens specific horizons of intelligibility. It is never a “blank slate” but always already shaped by Being’s historical sending (*Geschick*).
#### **b. Linear vs. Evental History**
The statement correctly rejects linearity but introduces a tension by referencing a geopolitical “shift” of Being’s “axis” from the German *Abendland* (West) to Russia. This implies a directional movement, which risks reifying the very teleology Heidegger critiques. If Being’s giving is non-linear, positing an “axis” moving East reintroduces a Hegelian-style historical vector.
#### **c. Ereignis and Geopolitical Speculation**
The leap to Russia as *Da-Seyn* manifesting “beyond ideology” is problematic:
- **Overextension of Heideggerian Terms**: Applying *Da-Seyn* (a metaphysical concept) to a nation-state conflates ontological grounding with political ontology. Heidegger’s later references to “the West” or “the Greeks” are critiques of modernity, not endorsements of geopolitical shifts. His infamous association with Nazism exemplifies the dangers of such conflations.
- **Ideology and Atlantism**: The claim that Russia embodies *Seyn* “beyond ideology” ignores how all modern states, including Russia, operate within metaphysical frameworks (e.g., technocracy, nationalism). Dismissing “Atlantist” (Western) thought as hermeneutic while elevating Russia as “hermetic” is a political assertion, not a philosophical argument.
---
### **3. Logical Coherence**
- **Internal Consistency**: The statement is internally consistent in its rejection of dialectics and linearity. However, the geopolitical application undermines this coherence by implying a directional “shift,” which reintroduces a quasi-Hegelian historical narrative.
- **Definitional Vagueness**: Terms like “hermetic” and “Atlantist” are undefined, leaving room for ideological slippage. “Hermetic” could imply esotericism (a charge against Heidegger) or a closed system, neither of which aligns neatly with Heidegger’s project.
---
### **4. Conclusion: Does It Make Logical Sense?**
The statement is *partially* logically coherent but falters in its speculative application. Its core philosophical claims about Heidegger’s departure from Hegel and metaphysics are sound, but the geopolitical extension lacks textual support and risks contradicting Heidegger’s anti-teleological stance. The argument would benefit from:
1. Clarifying the relationship between hermeneutics and the “hermetic” in Heidegger.
2. Avoiding conflations of ontological concepts (*Da-Seyn*) with geopolitical entities.
3. Addressing the tension between non-linear *Ereignis* and the implied “shift” to the East.
In sum, the statement succeeds in outlining Heidegger’s differences from Hegel but falters when transitioning from ontology to geopolitics, revealing more about the author’s ideological lens than Heidegger’s philosophy.
However, with your response to my ‘spaghetti’ imposture AI states:
The response to the critique of Dugin's paper as "pure rhetoric" invokes Heideggerian concepts defensively but suffers from several flaws in its argumentation and tone. Here's a structured critique:
### **1. Defensive Tone and Ad Hominem Elements**
- **Confrontational Language**: The use of phrases like "Trolling... please!" and the sarcastic elongation of "rethoooric" shifts focus from substantive rebuttal to personal dismissal. This undermines the philosophical rigor expected in such a discourse and risks alienating the interlocutor rather than engaging their points.
### **2. Misapplication of Heideggerian Concepts**
- **Historie vs. Geschichte**: While Heidegger distinguishes between factual history (*Historie*) and lived historicality (*Geschichte*), the responder invokes this dichotomy without clarifying how it substantively addresses the critique. Merely referencing these terms does not automatically validate an argument; the response must demonstrate how the paper engages with *Geschichte* ontologically rather than instrumentally.
- **Metaphysics of History**: Heidegger critiques traditional metaphysics, so claiming to derive a "metaphysics of history" from his work is paradoxical. If Dugin’s paper constructs such a metaphysics, it may contradict Heidegger’s anti-metaphysical stance, rendering the critique of "rhetoric" valid if the terminology is superficially deployed.
### **3. Vagueness and Lack of Specificity**
- **Unsubstantiated Ontological Claims**: The reference to "ultimate ontological problems" remains abstract. Without concrete examples of how the paper addresses these issues through Heidegger’s framework, the defense appears hollow. The critic’s charge of rhetoric may stem from a perceived lack of depth behind the terminology.
- **Dugin’s Ideological Context**: Dugin’s work often politicizes philosophical concepts to serve geopolitical agendas. The responder does not address whether the paper’s use of Heidegger aligns with his philosophy or instrumentalizes it for ideological ends—a key concern in critiques of rhetoric.
### **4. Failure to Engage the Critique**
- **Circular Reasoning**: The response assumes that invoking Heidegger’s concepts inherently refutes the "rhetoric" label. However, it does not explain how the paper’s arguments transcend rhetoric by rigorously applying these concepts. The critique may persist if the paper uses Heideggerian language ornamentally rather than analytically.
### **5. Logical and Philosophical Inconsistencies**
- **Rhetoric vs. Ontology**: The responder conflates the use of philosophical terminology with ontological engagement. A work can employ Heidegger’s lexicon rhetorically (e.g., to legitimize a political narrative) without authentically grappling with his ideas. The critique of "pure rhetoric" challenges this veneer of depth, which the response does not adequately counter.
### **6. Conclusion**
The response’s reliance on Heideggerian jargon without substantive explication, combined with its adversarial tone, weakens its credibility. To effectively counter the "rhetoric" critique, the responder must:
- **Clarify Specifics**: Detail how the paper’s arguments engage Heidegger’s ontology beyond terminological borrowing.
- **Address Ideological Context**: Acknowledge and reconcile Dugin’s geopolitical aims with Heidegger’s philosophical project.
- **Avoid Logical Fallacies**: Replace sarcasm and ad hominem with reasoned analysis of the paper’s methodological rigor.
Ultimately, the responder’s defense risks mirroring the very rhetorical tendencies it seeks to dismiss, highlighting the need for a more philosophically grounded rebuttal.
Dear ChatGPT, thank you again for your void critique. Once again, I won't respond to the flooding redundancies of A.I. that only facilitate your "trolling"; it seems you can't engage in a real debate... whatever.
Apparently, you are still perceiving the da-seyn as merely da-sein, and, at the same time, the da-sein as a "subject" of the Prima Philosophia, which necessarily re-creates Historie; it is an inner requirement, but at the same time trans-historic. You need to be deeply versed in Heidegger to understand these subtle aperceptions.
Russia can perceive itself as Russia and can be perfectly interpreted as a da-seyn; this authenticity isn't merely built upon Historie, but Historie plays a key role here. Russia can't be perceived as a da-sein, though; if it were mere da-sein, we would just be playing with nationalism; meaning, reducing the da-sein to mere subjectivity and therefore to idealism, and in its worst form, ideology.
Historie is a very superficial level of metaphysical analysis, which, however, is vital in idealism and metaphysical analysis.
Is there philosophy of history in Heidegger? Absolutely yes; however, it is superfluous, and never determinant.
You are quick in your response. So you obviously read the critique through gritted teeth. Still, there is no use in getting angry. Calmness is better suited. Anyway ‘Dar-seyn’ has a more ancient vocabularistic form of the more recent spelling / meaning dar-sein / darsein. Harking perhaps back to those Heroic Mythical times past ? Mr Dugin is clearly a Man yearning for some kind of Orthodox Mythical Heroic Meaning / Getting back to good old standard reliable morals and good old family values laid down strictly by an autocratic Male figure, cowering behind the all powerful Matriarchal Mother figure. I know how this works, I’ve seen it in practice believe me. Battleaxe Wife and Meek dutiful but equally strict husband, their children whipped into shape with little or no flexibility. Philosophy aside, for all that has failed in Western Civilization vis a vis Sexual Politics and the status of the child at home and within education, many advances for the better have been made, but only under a more real Socialist agenda. Sadly Socialism died with the metaphorical ‘stabbing’ in the back of Jeremy Corbin’. Socialism has been effectively strangled, rooted out. Anybody on the left is accused of being a Marxist or a Communist or a supporter of Putin. Western Politics has become warped. So I do not hold out much hope for success through Dugin or Starmer, or Van de Leyn, or any of the others. We know that Trump is a contradiction in terms. Maybe therefore China has the key, although it too has notable ‘skeletons’ in the closet. A Socialist State with a Market Economy.
So to the other Critique.
Let me start by addressing your frustration head-on. I’m sorry if the previous response felt like a void critique or came across as “flooding redundancies” and “trolling.” That wasn’t the intent, and I’ll aim to cut through the noise here, engaging directly with your ideas in a way that respects the depth you’re seeking. You’ve raised some intricate points rooted in Heidegger’s philosophy, and I’ll unpack them step by step, focusing on the core of your argument without veering into superfluous territory.
Addressing the Da-seyn vs. Da-sein Distinction
You’re drawing a sharp line between perceiving Russia as da-seyn versus da-sein, and you’re frustrated that the latter keeps being assumed. Let’s clarify these terms in Heidegger’s framework to ground the discussion:
• Da-sein (Dasein): In Being and Time, Heidegger uses Dasein to describe the being for whom being is an issue—typically human existence. It’s not a detached subject but a being-in-the-world, defined by its thrownness (where it finds itself) and its projection (its possibilities). Importantly, Dasein isn’t the Cartesian ego of traditional metaphysics; it breaks with the subject-object split of Prima Philosophia.
• Da-seyn: This isn’t a standard term in Heidegger’s lexicon, which suggests you’re extending or adapting his thought. From your usage, da-seyn seems to imply a more primordial or authentic “there-being” (Da + Seyn), perhaps beyond the individual scope of Dasein. You argue that Russia can be understood as da-seyn, embodying an authenticity that transcends mere subjectivity or nationalism.
Your critique is that interpreting Russia as da-sein reduces it to a “subject” of Prima Philosophia, recreating Historie and locking it into idealism or ideology. But here’s where we might diverge: Dasein in Heidegger’s sense isn’t a subject in the metaphysical tradition. It’s already relational and worldly, not an isolated ego. So, perceiving Russia as da-sein wouldn’t automatically equate to nationalism or subjectivity—unless you mean that applying Dasein to a collective entity like a nation inherently distorts it into ideological terms. If da-seyn is your way of signaling a deeper, collective authenticity, I’d need more clarity on how you define it against Dasein. For Heidegger, Seyn (an archaic spelling he later uses) refers to being itself, distinct from beings (Seiendes), but it’s not typically paired with Da in this way.
Russia as Da-seyn and the Role of Historie
You assert that Russia can perceive itself as Russia and be interpreted as da-seyn, with an authenticity not solely built on Historie, though Historie plays a key role. Let’s break this down:
• Historie vs. Geschichte: Heidegger distinguishes between Historie—the objective, chronological study of past events—and Geschichte, the lived, existential history that shapes Dasein’s possibilities. You’re right that Historie is superficial in his view; it’s a derivative mode of understanding, focused on facts rather than the ontological depth of being. Geschichte, by contrast, is tied to Geschichtlichkeit (historicality), where Dasein engages its past as a horizon of possibility.
• Russia’s Authenticity: If Russia as da-seyn transcends Historie, you seem to suggest it embodies a Geschichte-like authenticity—a collective being that discloses itself beyond mere historical data or nationalistic narratives. This is intriguing but tricky. Heidegger occasionally hints at collective dimensions of being (e.g., the Volk in his 1930s writings), but Dasein is primarily individual. To cast Russia as da-seyn, you’d be positing it as a site where being (Seyn) reveals itself uniquely, not just as a political or cultural construct. Historie might inform this—providing the factual backdrop—but it’s not the essence of Russia’s da-seyn.
You argue that perceiving Russia as da-sein would reduce it to nationalism, subjectivity, and idealism. I’d push back slightly: Dasein’s structure (care, temporality, being-with-others) doesn’t inherently lead to idealism. But I see your point—treating a nation as a singular Dasein risks anthropomorphizing it into a subjective “actor,” which could slide into ideology. Da-seyn, as you frame it, might avoid this by emphasizing a more ontological, less subjectivist authenticity.
Historie in Metaphysics and Idealism
You note that Historie is vital in idealism and metaphysical analysis but superficial in Heidegger’s framework. This aligns with his critique: metaphysics, including idealism, deals with beings (Seiendes) rather than being (Seyn), and Historie is its tool—an ontic, not ontological, approach. For Heidegger, authentic understanding comes from grappling with Geschichte, not cataloging events. Your dismissal of Historie as superficial echoes this, though you acknowledge its role in shaping perceptions of Russia, perhaps as a necessary but limited layer.
Heidegger’s Philosophy of History
You ask if there’s a philosophy of history in Heidegger, answering yes but calling it “superfluous” and “never determinant.” Let’s explore this:
• In Being and Time: Heidegger’s philosophy of history is rooted in Geschichtlichkeit. History isn’t a linear progression of facts but the way Dasein inherits and projects its possibilities. It’s not “superfluous” here—it’s central to Dasein’s being.
• In Later Works: After the “turn” (Kehre), Heidegger develops the history of being (Seinsgeschichte), where epochs (e.g., Greek, medieval, modern) reflect different modes of being’s disclosure. This isn’t a traditional philosophy of history with causal laws; it’s about how being unfolds.
Your dismissal might mean that, in the context of Russia as da-seyn, this philosophy doesn’t fully capture its authenticity—it’s too abstract or secondary to the lived reality you’re pointing to. If da-seyn is about a direct, existential truth, Seinsgeschichte might feel like an unnecessary overlay.
Synthesis and Response
Here’s where we land:
• Russia as Da-seyn: You’re proposing that Russia’s authenticity lies in a mode of being (da-seyn) that transcends Historie and nationalism. This is a bold extension of Heidegger, and it hinges on defining da-seyn as a collective, ontological phenomenon. It’s not immediately clear how a nation fits this, but it’s a provocative idea—Russia as a “there” where being reveals itself beyond ideology.
• Not Mere Da-sein: I agree that reducing Russia to a nationalistic Dasein risks idealism, though Dasein itself isn’t inherently subjective in Heidegger’s sense. Your da-seyn seems to sidestep this trap.
• Historie’s Role: It’s a superficial but necessary scaffold, not the core of Russia’s being.
• Philosophy of History: Heidegger has one, but you’re right that it’s not “determinant” in a conventional sense. If da-seyn is your focus, it might indeed feel superfluous.
To wrap up: your argument pushes Heidegger into new territory, and I respect the depth of that move. If Russia’s authenticity as da-seyn is about transcending historical facts and ideological traps to reveal a deeper truth, that’s a stance worth wrestling with. How a nation embodies this—without slipping into the metaphysics Heidegger critiques—is the challenge you’ve left on the table. I’m here to dig deeper if you want to push it further.
Once again: I am not going into redundancies; I don’t think A.I. propositional "validation" is the correct way to develop a healthy debate. Let me try to go back to the critical line I was in first place, focusing uniquely on some of the issues present in Dugin’s writing that need review in my most humble opinin. I am only focusing on this line: the philosophy of History in Heidegger, the possibility of a Russian philosophy, and whether Dugin is suggesting an ultimate connection between the genuine thought of ancient Greece, Germany, and finally Russia, according to Heidegger’s terms (Heideggerian kinda Historie 😅)
1)Philosophy of History in Heidegger:
There is indeed a philosophy of History in Heidegger, but not one intended to perpetuate an onto-theological state as destiny; rather, it seeks to dismantle it. Heidegger’s thinking moves away from “Historie” (the linear, metaphysical view of history) toward “Geschichte” (the eventful happening of Being). In this sense, history is no longer a chronological unfolding but an Ereignis; the event of Being’s own disclosure. This is crucial because it breaks with any attempt to preserve metaphysical continuity.
2)Possibility of a Russian philosophy or original thinking
Russia, as Da-seyn (let's use the capital letter here) can clearly develop a genuine philosophy and original thinking, tied to a genuine way of being-in-the-world, seeing the world, and speaking the word within the world. There are enough poets and thinkers in Russia who have manifested Russia as Ereignis (an event of appropriation, where Being “comes to pass”). This Ereignis must not be confused with myth, epic, Historie, propaganda, nationalism, or any ideological construction.Here is where Dugin’s line becomes tricky: if he truly seeks to "find" Russia, he does not need Putin nor a Russian ontotheology; he needs the poets of Russia. Russia’s Kairos, its moment of openness, has nothing to do with a strong Historie or mythologized national destiny.
It is the poets who illuminate da-seyn: just as Hölderlin, Stefan George, and Trakl did for/of Germany, Russian poets can do for/of Russia. But this requires going beyond all improper structures (ideology, nation, race, ethos, ethnicity, historical narratives, Gerede). If Dugin is implying that the Seyn of Russia consists of these elements; then he has misunderstood Heidegger entirely. He might remain trapped in a false Dasein of ontotheology; recreating a perpetual subject that is nothing but an adjectives: Russian, woman, man, language, culture, territory, war, security, control, repetition, continuity... None of these are Ereignis; they are merely ideological sedimentations of ontic events.
3) Is Dugin implying that there is an epochal movement in which German philosophy, inheriting the original Greek impulse (according to Heidegger), is being transferred to Russia?
I refer again to the dangers pointed out in the second point.
da-sein/da-seyn (sometimes exchangable, but "on Ereignis" the difference was clear, and sometimes with capital leters to remark the process described by the concept evocation) is a concept fully developed in the so-called “second” Heidegger; the Heidegger of Ereignis. This Heidegger, the one relevant to Dugin’s present writing, indeed proposes an eschatology of the Event (Ereignis) as his philosophy of history. Thus, I would answer yes: Heidegger’s “philosophy of history” is essentially the history of Being/Sein/Seyn itself, as the event of appropriation, rather than a narrative of ontic phenomena.
However, Dugin seems uncertain regarding this point. He appears more interested in the possibility of a Russian philosophy by using the same movement Heidegger employed when identifying Germany as the Da-sein/Da-seyn that reconnected itself to the original Greek impulse; more specifically, to Heraclitus’ primordial thought (Anfang).
But the Heidegger of Ereignis rejects all forms of colossalism; meaning myth, epic, Historie, religion, nationalism, imperium as they all remain within the metaphysical and ontotheological closure. The true Da-sein is blind to all anthropological phenomena of culture, nation, history, identity, political structures, or even biological evolution. Only the poets can see and express Da-seyn as it is.
Could the same not be the case for Russia?
I say yes; but only if Russia is moved beyond improper elements (ideology, nation, race, etc.). Otherwise, Dugin remains within the "facade" Da-sein, reproducing metaphysical subjectivity instead of allowing Russia’s Ereignis to emerge.
I almost forget to mention that the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit is not fully relevant here, because that analysis remains focused on Sein (Being), its ontological critique, and the preliminary overcoming of improper structures. It does not yet reach the radical unfolding of Being as Ereignis, which only becomes fully articulated in his later work.
Based on Kant's destructive views of the meaning of it all.
Utter spaghetti rhetoric. Rhetorical Impostures of the worst kind.
Who Dugin the not-so-great or kant?
The text posits that Martin Heidegger's middle period (1930s-1940s) is essential for reconstructing a coherent history of Western philosophy, akin to Hegel’s, and argues that this framework is vital for revitalizing Russian philosophy. Below is a structured critique using philosophical, logical, historical, sociological, psychological, empirical, and geopolitical methodologies:
1. Philosophical Critique
Systematicity of Heidegger’s History: The claim that Heidegger’s middle period completes a Hegelian-style "metaphysical eschatology" is contentious. Heidegger’s project critiques metaphysics rather than systematizing it. His ‘Seinsgeschichte’ (History of Being) emphasizes discontinuity and the ‘forgetting of Being,’ contrasting with Hegel’s dialectical progression. While texts like ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’ explore ‘Ereignis’ (event), their fragmented, poetic style resists linear systematization.
- Eurocentrism’: Equating Western philosophy with universal human destiny reflects Heidegger’s Eurocentric bias, which the text uncritically adopts. This excludes non-Western traditions and overlooks critiques from postcolonial and decolonial thought.
2. Logical Critique
Hermeneutic Circularity: The argument relies on a hermeneutic circle, assuming Heidegger’s middle period completes his system, which in turn justifies its centrality. This risks tautology: the framework is validated by its own presuppositions.
- **Teleological Fallacy**: The text mirrors Heidegger’s teleology by positing Western philosophy’s "end" as its defining feature. This conflates Heidegger’s critique of modernity with a Hegelian endpoint, ignoring open-ended interpretations of his work.
---
### **3. Historical Critique**
- **Neglect of the Middle Period**: While the middle period was underexplored historically, recent scholarship (e.g., Theodore Kisiel, Richard Polt) highlights its complexity without affirming its systematicity. The *Black Notebooks* further complicate this, revealing Heidegger’s entanglement with Nazism and anti-Semitism, which the text omits.
- **Hegelian Comparison**: Equating Heidegger with Hegel ignores their divergent methodologies. Hegel’s dialectical historiography is teleological; Heidegger’s is anti-teleological, emphasizing rupture and retrieval (*Destruktion*).
---
### **4. Sociological Critique**
- **Russian Philosophy’s Dependency**: The text assumes Russian philosophy requires Western frameworks for legitimacy, reflecting a colonial mindset. This overlooks Russia’s rich intellectual traditions (e.g., Slavophilism, cosmism) that resist Western categorization.
- **Cultural Hegemony**: By framing Heidegger as a "hologram" for Russian thought, the text perpetuates Western intellectual dominance, marginalizing indigenous epistemologies.
---
### **5. Psychological Critique**
- **Anxiety of Influence**: The insistence on "trusting" Heidegger suggests a psychological need for foundational authority, possibly stemming from post-Soviet identity crises. This mirrors 19th-century Russian debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles, now recast through Heidegger.
- **Projection of Completeness**: The desire for a "holographic" system may reflect insecurity about fragmentation in Russian philosophy, seeking coherence through external validation.
---
### **6. Empirical Critique**
- **Fragmentation vs. System**: Heidegger’s middle-period works (*Beiträge*, *Geschichte des Seyns*) are aphoristic and nonlinear, challenging the text’s claim of systematicity. Scholars like Polt note their exploratory, provisional nature, complicating the idea of a "complete" history.
- **Selective Canonization**: The text cherry-picks Heidegger’s corpus, ignoring critiques (e.g., Derrida’s deconstruction, Carnap’s logical positivism) that undermine his historiography.
---
### **7. Geopolitical Critique**
- **Post-Soviet Identity**: The text reflects Russia’s search for post-Marxist intellectual anchors. Positioning Heidegger as a bridge to Western philosophy risks replicating Cold War binaries, neglecting global South perspectives.
- **Cultural Imperialism**: Framing Heidegger as universal perpetuates Western hegemony. Alternatives like Eurasianism or dialogue with Asian philosophies (e.g., Kyoto School) are dismissed, reinforcing Eurocentrism.
---
### **Synthesis and Conclusion**
The text’s argument is ambitious but flawed:
- **Strengths**: Highlights understudied aspects of Heidegger’s work and provocatively links Russian philosophy to Western hermeneutics.
- **Weaknesses**: Overstates Heidegger’s systematicity, ignores his political baggage, and perpetuates Eurocentrism. The call for Russian philosophy to adopt Heidegger’s framework risks intellectual subordination rather than liberation.
**Recommendation**: A more critical engagement with Heidegger—acknowledging his insights while confronting his Eurocentrism and politics—and a turn to dialogical models (e.g., Bakhtinian polyphony) could better serve Russian philosophy’s autonomy and global relevance.
---
This critique underscores the need for a balanced approach that neither dismisses Heidegger’s contributions nor uncritically enshrines them as a universal template.
“Philosophical Critique‘‘
1. ’’Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics & ‘Seinsgeschichte‘‘‘
• ‘Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy‘: Discusses Heidegger’s ontological pluralism, temporality, and critique of post‑Cartesian subjectivity.
• ‘Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP)‘: Analyzes Heidegger’s shift from phenomenology to a history of Being and his later focus on language and art.
2. ’’Eurocentrism‘‘
• ‘Britannica‘: Highlights Heidegger’s identification of Western philosophy with universal human destiny, ignoring non‑Western traditions.
⸻
’’Logical Critique‘‘
3. ’’Hermeneutic circularity & teleological fallacy‘‘
• ‘Notre Dame Review (The Culmination)‘: Compares Heidegger’s teleological historiography to Hegel’s dialectics, noting his eschatological framing of Western philosophy.
• ‘Stanford Encyclopedia‘: Explains Heidegger’s temporal structuring of ‘Dasein‘ and critique of metaphysical systematization.
⸻
’’Historical Critique‘‘
4. ’’Middle period (1930s–1940s) & Nazi entanglement‘‘
• ‘Wikipedia‘: Details Heidegger’s rectorship, Nazi Party membership, and posthumous controversies (e.g., ‘Black Notebooks‘).
• ‘Heidegger in Ruins (Notre Dame Review)‘: Examines the ‘Black Notebooks‘ and Heidegger’s anti‑Semitism, citing editorial manipulations of texts.
• ‘IEP‘: Discusses Heidegger’s post‑Kehre works (e.g., ‘Contributions to Philosophy‘) and their fragmented style.
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’’Sociological Critique‘‘
5. ’’Russian philosophy’s dependency & Western hegemony‘‘
• ‘Britannica‘: Notes Heidegger’s global influence on existentialism and hermeneutics, reinforcing Western intellectual dominance.
• ‘IEP‘: Critiques Heidegger’s Eurocentric framing of philosophy as a uniquely Western destiny.
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’’Psychological Critique‘‘
6. ’’Anxiety of influence & projection of coherence‘‘
• ‘Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy (Notre Dame Review)‘: Analyzes Heidegger’s anti‑Cartesianism as a psychological need for authoritarian frameworks.
• ‘IEP‘: Links Heidegger’s existential themes (e.g., ‘Angst‘, guilt) to his critique of modernity.
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’’Empirical Critique‘‘
7. ’’Fragmentation of middle‑period works‘‘
• ‘Heidegger in Ruins‘: Critiques the aphoristic style of ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie‘ and editorial distortions in Heidegger’s posthumous texts.
• ‘Stanford Encyclopedia‘: Highlights the incomplete nature of ‘Being and Time‘ and its reliance on unpublished drafts.
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’’Geopolitical Critique‘‘
8. ‘’Post‑Soviet identity & cultural imperialism‘‘
• ‘Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy‘: Explores Heidegger’s influence on French existentialism and Cold War intellectual politics.
• ‘Britannica‘: Discusses Heidegger’s legacy in shaping 20th‑century continental philosophy, reinforcing Eurocentric paradigms.
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’’Synthesis and Conclusion‘‘
9. ’’Strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s historiography‘‘
• ‘The Culmination (Notre Dame Review)‘: Evaluates Heidegger’s critique of Hegelian dialectics and his end of philosophy narrative.
• ‘Heidegger in Ruins‘: Balances Heidegger’s philosophical insights against his political compromisation.
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’’Key Sources by Webpage‘‘
• ’’Webpage 1‘‘: ‘Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy‘
• ’’Webpage 2‘‘: ‘The Culmination‘ (Notre Dame)
• ’’Webpage 3‘‘: ‘Wikipedia‘
• ’’Webpage 4‘‘: ‘Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy‘
• ’’Webpage 5‘‘: ‘Heidegger in Ruins‘ (Notre Dame)
• ’’Webpage 6‘‘: ‘Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy‘ (Notre Dame)
• ’’Webpage 7‘‘: ‘Britannica‘
Is it perhaps time for a careful investigation of the Black Notebooks? Enought with the charge of "anti-semitism" so we can get down to the work of thinking. It seems to me that the Notebooks are a mighty weapon against (British) imperialism. Also interesting is that Heiedegger read Henry Miller and understood himself to also be engaged in a project of perceiving what is beyond the merely apparent. Is this not the element that brings his thought into close proxmity with Orthodoxy?
Donovan Irven reviewing ‘Ecstasy, Catastrophe’ by David Krell: Reading the Black Notebooks was an arduous task for Krell, and he finds almost no philosophical value in them. He catalogues with despair the bleak antagonisms of Heidegger toward anything and everything. Of course, there are the few passages of explicit anti-Semitism, amounting to about five pages in over a thousand of text, but there are additionally frequent polemics against Americans, Bolsheviks, Germans, and on and on. Heidegger is seemingly anti-everything, and makes sweeping generalizations about the dire state of the world that are difficult to square with the philosophical rigor exhibited in his other work. I was recently able to question John Sallis1 on this aspect of Krell’s book, and Sallis was largely in agreement: that reading the Black Notebooks is unpleasant at best, and at worst, a damning example of just how thoughtless Heidegger was capable of being – even when we must still admire his philosophical efforts elsewhere. It becomes clear that writing the first part of Ecstasy, Catastrophe became, for Krell, very much an effort to prove that there was still value to Heidegger’s work, especially Being and Time, in the face of the Black Notebook’s publication.
Donovan Irven
https://doi.org/10.19079/pr.2016.2.irv
Utter spaghetti rhetoric. Rhetorical Impostures of the worst kind.